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THE IDEA OF THE LAW REVIEW:
SCHOLARSHIP, PRESTIGE AND OPEN ACCESS
by
MichaelJ. Madison"
This Essay is a rigorous and serious account of how the current economy of
academic legal publishing thwarts efforts by authors andjournals to supplant that
economy via open access publishing and distributionmodels. Law professors, law
schools, and universitiesgenerally like the system as it is. Instead, the Essay argues
that open access models must complement that economy, rather than supplant it.

This appears to be a paper about law reviews, which happens to be situated
in a conversation about open access. It's really a paper about open access,
which happens to be situated in a conversation about law reviews.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea behind open access for scholarly publishing-that is, increasing
the spread of what academics call "knowledge"-sounds like it should be selfevidently good. But it's not; or, at least when the idea is considered in isolation,
we can't tell. As a result, and although open access models are intended to
make "knowledge" more widely available, any conversation about those
models has to confront an important question: Who cares? Here I want to focus
on open access for a specific brand of scholarship, that is, legal scholarship. In
that context, the discussion of open access is complicated by the long and
sensible criticism that law reviews are purveyors of turgid, vapid prose.' Who
cares about disseminating that, we might say, except, perhaps, law professors
themselves? In this Essay, I take a stab at answering that question.
Some scientific journals and academic scientists have taken steps along the
open access path. By and large, academic lawyers have not. Yet asking why
law reviews haven't yet joined their scientific counterparts (the nominal

*Associate Dean for Research and Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. Email: madison@law.pitt.edu. Copyright (c) 2006 Michael J. Madison.

Thanks to Lydia Loren and Joe Miller and Lewis & Clark Law School for inviting me to
participate in the Open Access Conference, and thanks to participants in that conference for
their comments. Thanks also to Bernard Hibbitts, Joe Miller, and Al Brophy for helpful
criticism. I owe a special debt of gratitude to John Parry for his willingness to present this
paper at the conference when, at the last moment, I was unable to attend myself.
1 See Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962)
(updating and extending Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936)).
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premise of this symposium) may put the proverbial cart before the horse. To
ask about open access publishing for any scholarly domain is to ask about the
very idea of scholarship in that domain. Open access for law reviews really
invites a hard look at law reviews and legal scholarship in general. Instead Of
talking about the future of law review publishing, then, I want to talk a bit
about its past. Law reviews and legal scholars have gotten along acceptably
with the current system for well over a century. For them, the system has
worked pretty well. The question isn't so much why law reviews haven't
embraced change. The question for law reviews, as it might be for any
scholarly institution, is why they should.
The Essay explains how open access might be accommodated in the only
world that law reviews and legal scholars know.
I wrote a first draft of this piece using the usual rituals and conventions of
legal scholarship, and then I discarded it. The disclaimer is necessary for some
nonobvious reasons.
First, although I'm serious about my thesis, I really would like people to
read this even outside the legal academy.2 Along the way, I sacrifice some
nuance, and occasionally some scholarly sobriety, in favor of narrative interest
and readability.
Second, form aside, I have a broader point about substance. An abstract
case for open access for law reviews doesn't make sense. Understanding the
open access argument truly requires a discussion of the conceptual foundations
of the publishing domain where the argument arises. The same principle applies
to any other scholarly discipline and, for that matter, to any kind of published
work. The title of the piece is a bit of misdirection; when we consider open
access in any context, we're holding a concept of a scholarly domain up to the
light of a publishing aspiration. "Open Access" in this context really requires
investigating "The Idea of the Law Review." There is a concept of "the law
review" that law professors have carried around in their heads, more or less
consistently, for decades. I need to talk about what that is before I can talk
about whether open access for law reviews is a good thing, why the reviews are
reluctant to go down that path, and ultimately how to think about open access
in general. To do that, I need to step just outside my usual scholarly role.
Third, I don't claim that I'm the first person or that this is the first piece to
make the claims that follow. 3 So, this piece doesn't track some conventions of
2 The title is a holdover from that earlier concept, which draped a deconstruction of the

various traditional and modem purposes of law reviews over an intellectual framework
borrowed from JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY: A REEXAMINATION
(1992), in conversation with JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (Frank M.
Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1852). Pelikan argues that an institution derives its
character from the ideas-plural-that precede it, and he evaluates the modem research
university accordingly. See PELIKAN, supra, at 24.
3 See Rob Kling & Geoffrey McKim, Scholarly Communication and the Continuum
of
Electronic Publishing,50 J. Am. SOC'Y FOR INFO. Sci. & TECH. 890 (1999); Rob Kling, Lisa
B. Spector & Joanna Fortuna, The Real Stakes of Virtual Publishing: The Transformation of
E-Biomed into PubMed Central, 55 J. AM. SOC'Y FOR INFO. Sci. & TECH. 127 (2004). Cf
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"good" legal scholarship. While legal scholars are supposed to give the answer
away before the argument begins, I don't want to do that. I will give away the
following, however: As I wrote in the very first sentence of this Essay, what is
the text of my discussion and what is the context, or what is field and what is
ground, can easily be mistaken.
II.
Before I get to the idea of the law review, I'll start with open access
publishing in general. "Open access" means an arrangement under which a
journal allows its authors to self-publish their articles on freely-accessible4
websites or to post those articles in freely-accessible "open access" archives.
The point is to make the content more widely accessible, so that more people
can read it. Academic writing is "knowledge," in scholars' conventional if
somewhat self-aggrandizing understanding, and our duty as scholars is to
promote the dissemination of knowledge for the good of humanity. If that's the
baseline, though, then it really isn't so clear right away why open access is a
good thing. There are perfectly respectable commercial publishers out there,
and their owners and employees need to eat, and when they do their jobs
properly, scholarly articles find their way into the journals, the journals find
their way into the hands of paying customers, and the customers put them away
on shelves and commercial databases where they are almost universally ignored
by everyone--except other scholars. Open access doesn't necessarily mean that
existing scholarship gets read more, or that more scholarship gets read in the
first place. It simply means that more scholarship is out there, and that existing
scholarship is out there more, but that none of the work is necessarily any more
visible that what we see today. Rob Kling and Geoffrey McKim made this
point in simple terms when they observed that scholarly publication serves
three functions: Making the work accessible, publicizing the work, and
endorsing the work as trustworthy. 5 Open access helps with the first problem,
but not (necessarily) the other two.
All of this applies in spades to law reviews, which offer the paradigm for
what law professors call legal scholarship. And legal scholarship in the law
reviews adds complications to the general academic publishing picture. As
every law professor, lawyer, and judge in the world knows, legal scholarship in
the American law reviews tends to be even more impenetrably jargon-filled
than ordinary academic writing. It tends to be much, much longer than ordinary
scholarship (that is, journal writing by every other academic discipline), and
Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Legal Education: First Impressions, FIRST MONDAY, Sept.

2002, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue79/duguid/index.html (noting that sometimes
less access to legal literature is more consistent with the institution's overall socializing
function).
4 Like a lot of phrases in contemporary information policy debates, "open access"
means slightly different things to different people. Since Dan Hunter was the first person to
put the topic on the table in connection with legal journals, I adopt his definition. Dan
Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 607, 617 (2005).
5 See Kling & McKim, supra note 3.
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(most important) it often has little to do with what real lawyers are interested
in, which is making a living. 6 This little rhetorical excess aside, realistically,
law professors know that few people outside of law schools actually read the
law reviews. They also know that even within law schools, a lot of law review
writing isn't read very much, and only those faculty members with a certain
idealistic bent, those without tenure, and those who are members of tenure and
promotion committees seem to take the material seriously on anything
approaching a regular basis.
That last paragraph consists of the usual indictment of law reviews, and
that indictment seems to have little to do with publishing models per se, or with
open access in particular. But the most important complication that legal
scholarship adds to the usual journal publishing story isn't the fact that the
substance, by and large, is irrelevant to the condition of the world at large. The
most important complication is the fact that virtually every law professor and
judge in America has free desktop access to law review literature via
comprehensive commercial databases (Westlaw and LexisNexis). Almost every
law review is published by a law school, which finances a significant portion of
its production costs,7 and almost every law review is edited by law students.
Hard copies of each issue are distributed via subscription, mostly to law
libraries, and electronic copies are distributed to commercial databases in
exchange for royalties. Most of the publishing process, however, is completely
hidden from most law review readers, who directly pay little or nothing for the
privilege of reading. For other academic disciplines, commercial publishing has
the significant drawback of making it really expensive for scholars to get access
to what's happening in their fields. Open access reduces the cost of access
dramatically, whether or not it encourages scholars to read the work. In law,
scholars already have ready access to their colleagues' work. And they still
don't read it. What's the point of making the work.., free?
So there's the dilemma in a nutshell. What's the difference between the
system as we find it-scholarship written by scholars for scholars, and made
available for free in online commercial databases that are entirely subsidized by
our institutional employers -and the open access system that we hypothesize
6

Oops; I mean, pursuing justice and solving their clients' problems. See, e.g., Harry T.

Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFFAIRS,

Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 57, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/NovemberDecember-2004/review posnernovO604.msp. For a less critical view from the bench, see
Kenneth F. Ripple, The Role of the Law Review in the Tradition of JudicialScholarship, 57
N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 429 (2000), available at http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/annualsurvey/

html/issue.php?issueID=8.
7 As Jessica Litman's contribution to this symposium observes, one law school
subsidizes the production of the journal itself, the authors' law schools subsidize the
production of the journal's content. Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access
Publishing, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 779, 789-90 (2006).
8 The subsidy may be deeper. It's plausible to assume that law schools aren't paying

full freight for their students and faculty, and that academic access is subsidized by high
rates paid by practitioners, which are often passed on to their clients. Thanks to Joe Miller
for this observation.
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we're missing? My first cut at the problem suggests that the difference isnothing.
III.
There has to be more here than meets the eye, and there is, but to describe
it I have to step even farther outside my scholarly role. I have to adopt a pose.
To get from a premise that doubts open access to a conclusion that law reviews
may not need it,
I need a theory. I'm going to adopt a clever heuristic device
and argue that it solves the problem and explains the universe, and I'm going to
borrow it from some non-legal field that I declare to be relevant. I'm going to
do this at such an abstract level that the result is unverifiable and probably
unrepeatable. This is, of course, precisely the sort of undisciplined crossdisciplinary borrowing by a would-be legal "scholar" that practicing lawyers
and non-lawyer academics criticize: Is this scholarship? Legal scholarship?
Fortunately, I already have tenure.
The keys to the kingdom, the solution to Hilbert's Tenth Problem, the
answer to the curious incident of the dog in the night time, is the following
phrase: The economy of prestige. Law professors, law reviews, law schools,
and law students think they have it (prestige, that is). They suspect that open
access is going to take it away. The seemingly endless, bitter criticism of law
reviews has the paradoxical effect of validating the current system. Challenging
law reviews to subscribe to an open access norm, because that will make both
scholars themselves and the world better off than they are now, may even be
counterproductive. Let me explain.
The "economy of prestige" isn't my phrase, it isn't my idea, and this isn't
the first time that anyone has tried to explain legal scholarship in symbolic
terms. 9 Julius Getman wrote that research serves as a "dress suit for academic
elitism."10 There is, however, a method to my apparent madness. The precise
phrase "economy of prestige" comes from the field of something called cultural
studies, and it's the title of a recent book by James English, who teaches
English at the University of Pennsylvania. 1" English looks at criticisms of
literary prizes, which are frequently the targets of derision by supporters of
writers who have been snubbed, and he puzzles over why the prizes persist, and
are so highly valued, despite the criticism. I care about what English has to say,
but if I had to explain the whole thing, then this piece would be even longer
than it is already. 12 Instead, I'd rather borrow from the review of English's
9 Or in economic terms directly. See George L. Priest, Triumphs or Failingsof Modern
Legal Scholarship and the Conditions of Its Production,63 U. COLO. L. REv. 725 (1992).
10 JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF

HIGHER EDUCATION 43 (1992).
11 JAMES ENGLISH, THE ECONOMY
CIRCULATION OF CULTURAL VALUE (2005).

OF

PRESTIGE:

PRIZES,

AWARDS,

AND

THE

12 If you must know, English's theory can be distilled into the concept that the tools of

economic understanding can be applied (evoking and invoking Bourdieu) to fields of
symbolic cultural production. The result is the sort of thing that Robert Merton praised as a
theory of "the middle range":
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book by Louis Menand, himself a Harvard professor. Menand sums up
English's analysis this way:
[English's] theory is that when people make these objections to the nature
of prizes [objections based on the idea that they really aren't all that
important] they are helping to sustain a collective belief that true art has
nothing to do with things like politics, money, in-group tastes, and
beating out the other guy. As long as we want to believe that creative
achievement is special, that a work of art is not just one more commodity
seeking to aggrandize itself in the marketplace at the expense of other
works of art, we need prizes so that we can complain about how stupid
they are.'3
Now it's not important to my argument whether Menand has English's
theory precisely right or not; for now, the summary is close enough, and I'll
call it Menand's theory. My point is that Menand's theory explains just about
everything that we need to understand about why law review publishing works
the way it does, why open access hasn't set the law review world on fire, and
even why we're seeing blogging, shorter commentaries in online versions of
the reviews, and so on.
When it comes to law reviews, the first part of the economy of prestige
should be obvious to law professors. We believe that we're the most important
part of the legal profession. 14 More important than legislators, more important
than judges, and much more important than actual practicing lawyers. This
follows from a few commonplace observations. First, legislators, judges, and
lawyers complain all the time that law professors don't write articles that matter
to the real world of the law. And law professors don't care. They're too busy
articulating the background assumptions of the law, reconceptualizing the law
in terms of theories borrowed from other fields, and pointing out that you can't
be a real lawyer (or at least an effective lawyer) without situating your client's
position in its theoretical context.15 Second, law professors invented law school
On the one hand, we have various forms of close reading, in which one work or a small

handful of individual works of art are meant to yield up a wealth of knowledge and
insight through the sheer genius of the artist and/or ingenuity of the critic. On the other
hand, we have various attempts to survey and pronounce upon the circumstances and
trajectories of cultural life as a whole, based on general theories of cultural production
and consumption and broad assessments of national or global trends. What's left out is
the whole middle-zone of cultural space, a space crowded not just with artists and
consumers but with bureaucrats, functionaries, patrons, and administrators of culture,
vigorously producing and deploying such instruments as the best-of list, the film
festival, the artists' convention, the book club, the piano competition.
Id. at 12. Cf ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39 (enlarged ed.

1968).

13 Louis Menand, All That Glitters: Literature's Global Economy, NEW YORKER, Dec.
26, 2005 & Jan. 2, 2006, at 136.
14 Cf GETMAN, supra note 10, at 43 ("Research ... [clothes] with respectability the

attitudes that the academic enterprise is more important, demanding, and complex than other
endeavors and that first-rate academics are different, smarter, and more creative than other
people.").

15Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground, " 91 MICH. L. REV.
2075 (1993).
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(that's true), 16 and that means that they invented lawyers (mostly true, since
lawyers all graduated from law school). To some of us, I suspect that it means
17
that law professors invented law. Third, it's a lot harder to get a job as a law
professor than it is to get a job as a lawyer. Almost anyone with enough money
and three years of endurance can get a law degree and hang out a shingle.
Nowadays, even getting a job as a law professor requires writing at least one
law review article. Enough said.
Legislators, judges, and practicing lawyers undoubtedly don't agree with
law professors on this, but I have to take a moment to point out why this
matters. If law professors aren't the most important part of the legal profession
(or at least if they don't believe they are, which may be more important) pretty
much all of the rest of my argument falls apart, and I still have more than 5,000
words to go. But I think that the premise holds up. If law professors aren't
fundamentally concerned with professional prestige, then they should be
perfectly happy to publish "scholarship" that mimics Continuing Legal
Education seminars and provides a direct and obvious service to practicing
lawyers everywhere. A few law professors do that, and do it happily, but the
vast majority do not.
Step two is really just some elaboration of the premise, so it's a half-step,
or perhaps a couple of quarter-steps. The first piece is this. Not only do law
professors believe that they are the most important part of the legal profession,
but they believe that they are just as important as professors in other schools
and departments in the university. 1 Now it's easy to see why law professors
have to be the most important members of the legal profession, because if they
were less important than judges, say, they could never be as important as
economics professors or academic art historians, who are at least as important
as their non-academic colleagues. And it's key to my argument that law
professors are as important as economics professors and academic art historians
because those folks get tenure, which is lifetime job security, and not even law
firm partners get that any more. 19 How do those folks get tenure? How do law
professors keep their position alongside fellow faculty and at the top of
professional heap? How do legal scholars reap the prestige that is so obviously
their due? By publishing their work in scholarlyjournals.
The second piece is a bit of amateur ontology. How do we know that law
reviews are scholarlyjournals? The answer is that they're scholarly journals
because law schools say so. Law schools have long enjoyed saying so. The law
review as an academic enterprise was created, like so many things, by faculty
and students at Harvard Law School, and it flourished in the late 19th and early

16 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO

THE 1980s (1983).
17 This isn't the place for a jurisprudential debate, but "what is the nature of law?" is a
question that has occupied a lot of law review pages.
18 Note that Getman's sartorial summary of research isn't limited to law.
19 Judges do, but judges often believe that law professors believe that law professors
are more important than judges. Perhaps more than anything else, that explains the
occasional burst of judicial hostility toward legal scholarship. See Edwards, supra note 6.
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20th centuries as law schools came to adopt the "Harvard model" (which
included both the case method of classroom instruction and publication of a
scholarly journal) as a route to respectability.2 °
Step three is to set these parts in motion, that is, to explain how law
reviews are scholarly journals because law schools say so. Describing the
workings of the economy of prestige requires, in short, that I unbundle "law
schools" into some subparts. ("Unbundle" is a word that appeals to law-andeconomics scholars. Critical scholars can substitute the word "deconstruct."
Mere mortals can read it as "This is what that phrase means.")
One subpart is the faculty. Legal journals are scholarly journals because
"scholars" say so, and faculty members at law schools are, to use the circular
reasoning that the prestige theory depends on, legal scholars.
A second subpart is the students. Legal journals are scholarly journals
because law students say so, especially, but not exclusively, the student editors
of the law review. Student editors need the law review credential for the job
market, and non-members of the review need to criticize the irrelevance of the
review in order to validate its importance within the student body. Students and
alumni also need the imputed prestige of the law review because law school
prestige and law review prestige are closely correlated, and student perceptions
of law school quality, and decisions on which school to attend, are closely
correlated with law school prestige. The better the law review, the better the
law school, and vice versa. Of course, students aren't the only parts of the
economy that benefit from this association.
A third subpart is the university. The university obviously isn't a subpart
of the law school, but I call it a subpart of "the law school" as an institutional
player, because for my purposes the law school plays the dominant role in
validating law reviews as scholarly, and the university generally plays a
secondary role. Legal journals are scholarly journals because academic units
within a university publish scholarship, and a university would be pretty
ashamed to discover that tenured faculty were producing a newspaper.
Let me talk about each of those subparts for a paragraph or so. Where does
this lead, and how do we know that the description is on the mark? As a bit of
foreshadowing, here's a tip: Look for the criticism of the reviews as useless
hunks of parchment. That's a signal that they're worth something.
An economy is a means of producing things. What does the economy of
prestige produce, especially for law professors themselves? As authors, they get
the prestige of branding by the schools whose reviews publish their work. That
branding feeds further branding by their own institutions, which validate this
form of publishing via tenure and promotion reviews. Both forms of prestige
circulation feed and are fed by colleagues in other schools, who recognize and
respond to scholarship by praising publication in "higher quality" law
reviews. 2 ' "Higher quality," of course, refers largely to the "quality" of the
20 See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 118 n.34, 157 n.13, 191.

2 Despite the many and obvious flaws of an article selection system that puts authority
in the hands of law students, authors take pride in being published in a "top 10" journal or a
"top 20" journal, on the implied premise that the student editors who select the manuscripts
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faculty, and the "quality" of the faculty is largely gauged (not to say measured)
by its scholarship, which is gauged largely by its placement in law reviews.
I assume, by the way, that there is something that we can talk about
coherently as "legal scholarship," even though outside the law schools, pretty
much everyone in the academy knows that what law professors do can't really
be called "scholarship" because there are no quality standards,and (aside from
a few quirky journals) there is no peer review, and that means that most
everything that shows up in legal journals is badly-researched,badly-written,

and badly-argued.But those objections are mistaken.
Why? Because the rituals of scholarship, including its murkiness, define
scholarship itself. Scholarship is what scholars exchange with one another,
which means that scholarship is what shows up in scholarly publications,
despite (or perhaps because of) the scholarly obligation to disseminate
"knowledge" beyond the walls of the academy. 22 Legal scholars, like other
scholars, care most of all about what other scholars think of their work and not
nearly so much about what other lawyers or judges, let alone "the public," think
of the work. Scholars of all stripes write primarily for each other. Criticism of
the forms and rituals of scholarship simply reinforces its scholarly character.
I can generalize the point: Legal scholars most of all love being part of
The Academy. Being part of The Academy means that everyone thinks that
you're a scholar. Some law professors claim that they're trying to find truth and
meaning in the world so that they can improve the pursuit of justice. 24 That
proposition is appealing, at least at first, since legal professors usually are
lawyers too, which means that we subscribe to the norms of the legal profession
as a whole. By setting out the proposition for contrast I don't intend to
disrespect its adherents. But since everyone knows that no one really reads
legal scholarship, they can't really mean that, at least not all of the time. If your
mission is to save the world, there are better things to do with your time than
write law review articles.25
If that's right, then practitioner criticism of law reviews just misses the
point entirely. Law reviews aren't supposed to help practicing lawyers solve
their clients' problems. (If law professors really wanted to spend as much time
on clients as they spend on law review articles, they would be practicing
lawyers themselves, and then most of them would make much more money.)
Ray Stanz once said, "Personally, I liked the University. They gave us money
for publication are wise in proportion to the overall prestige ascribed to their law school
and/or to their university.
22 See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 121-33.
23 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and
Its Audience, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 569 (1992); Judith Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic
Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1989).
24 See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (2002); Jeffrey
S. Brand, Law Schools and the Pursuit ofJustice, 37 U. TOLEDO L. REV.13 (2005).
25 See Robert C. Post, Legal Scholarshipand the Practiceof Law, 63 U. COLO. L. REv.
615, 624-25 (1992) (noting the intractable tensions between the scholarly tradition of law
faculty situating themselves inside the profession and their desire to explore forms of
scholarship that are external to the law itself).
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and facilities, we didn't have to produce anything. . .. [Y]ou don't know what
it's like out there. I've worked in the private sector. They expect results." 26 Ray
was a Ghostbuster, but he had a wise soul. As writers, we're scholars, which
means (and I say this in the best possible sense) that we're here to talk amongst
ourselves. The application of the work comes through our teaching, and
through our teaching to our students, and via our students into the world at
large.
The mechanisms of professorial prestige for law faculty can be elaborated
in more detail. Long articles on obscure topics get published under the imprint
of an academic institution, almost always one that's attached to a real
university. Law professors have few professional or learned societies to publish
their work, so if you want to be treated as a "scholar" in law, you only have so
many choices. One is to submit articles to peer-reviewed journals. In terms of
manufacturing prestige, peer-reviewed publishing works pretty well, but there
aren't many peer-reviewed journals for legal scholarship, and that limits their
potential as prestige suppliers. 27 A second is to publish books. Like peerreviewed publishing, book publishing usually marks quality and well-branded
scholarship in most academic fields, but it doesn't work so well in law, even
though once upon a time "scholarship" in "books" was a respectable activity
for law professors. The problem is that the traditional form of book-based legal
scholarship is the treatise, and the treatise is the kind of scholarship that doesn't
count for tenure and promotion as much as it used to. Treatises on the law are
wonderful and useful things if you're a practicing lawyer, but they aren't so
helpful if you're a scholar, that is, a fellow traveler in search of The Truth. By
definition, now that law professors have all thoroughly internalized the lessons
of the Legal Realists, we're skeptical when we're told that someone else (that
is, a treatise writer) has synthesized and rationalized the cases and in the
process (implicitly) found The Truth. The law is intersubjective and
constructed. Our job as scholars is to discern the social and cultural and
economic relations hidden amid conventional legal forms. So we're hardly
likely to validate The Truth as "scholarship." As authors, we'd rather engage in
the search; as faculty reviewing our colleagues' work for tenure, we want to
validate the search; and as colleagues, we want to praise those whose methods
succeed in the law review selection sweepstakes. In the latter two contexts,
there but for the grace of God go I. In the former context, of course, there I go.
Or more simply put: What goes around, comes around.
Even law books that aren't treatises, by the way, don't feed the prestige
economy so well, even though English professors and history professors write
books, and they're authentic scholars. Academic books are usually published
by university presses, which offer genuine academic branding in all of the
senses that I just mentioned. For law professors, though, that strategy won't do,
because they flatter their own field by arguing that the law changes, and
sometimes it changes quickly. A medium that doesn't evolve quickly (books
26

1984).
27

The words were actually spoken by Dan Aykroyd. GHOSTBUSTERS (Sony Pictures
Scholars in other fields would concur. But they wouldn't see this as a problem.
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typically take a while to write and to publish) can't handle the law, which we
know is an incredibly dynamic thing. Moreover, monographs don't lend
themselves to use in the modified Socratic case method that dominates law
school teaching. Scholarly journals, on the other hand, and especially journals
published with little editorial scrutiny, are just the ticket for legal scholars. In
theory, you can assemble an article on some novel point pretty quickly and get
it published pretty quickly after that. Because these journals look a lot like
journals in other fields (articles, periodic publishing, paper and binding), legal
scholars can get the best of both worlds. They get the prestige of being
published in something that has the brand of a university and the relative speed
of being published in a journal.
Not insignificantly, the system depends entirely on the mostly-free labor of
a student editorial workforce. In fact, absolutely the worst thing about law
review publishing, whether you're a reader or a writer, is that the law students
who select the articles and edit them are absolutely unqualified to do so. So
much so that all kinds of drivel finds its way to print, including crossdisciplinary and inter-disciplinary and non-disciplinary and just out-there kinds
of things that no respectable scholarly journal in any other field would dare
touch. From the students' and law schools' points of view, though, the great
thing about the system is that for the most part, none of this matters. Law
review membership is the traditional brass ring of the law school experience,
the Golden Ticket, the top of the totem pole. It's the signal that counts for
future employers, whether those are law firms or judges or even law schools.
Law review membership used to signal that someone was not only willing to
work hard but had also learned something of substance about reading, writing,
and analyzing the law. Harvard at one point considered the law review to be an
extension of the case method of instruction. 28 Some faculty even characterized
it as a form of "clinical" education. 29 Now, at many schools, membership is a
signal mostly of itself. Most students now recognize the work as sheer
drudgery, reading endless half-finished manuscripts submitted by professors,
learning and applying the Bluebook (the most arcane rule-based system they
ever encounter in the legal profession) and, for a few, writing up an analysis of
a recent case that few know and fewer will ever remember.
The essence of this system, remember, is the same thing that keeps law
professors submitting their work to the reviews. Getting onto the law review
originally meant top academic performance, so in a sense being an editor was
double-dipping at the employment trough. But the imprint of the university,
validating the double-dipping, was important. Most law professors were
members of their own law reviews. Would that experience have been equally

28

See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 118 n.34 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE

BUSH (1930)).

29 See id. at 215 n.88 (citing Alan W. Mewett, Reviewing the Law Reviews, 8 J. LEGAL

EDUC. 188 (1955), and David F. Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 449 (1943)).
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30
important if the journal had been named the "New Haven Law Review"?
Students aren't really scholars, but they can more or less pretend to be because
they hang around stacks of scholarship in the law review offices, and the label
makes the pretense stand up. "New Haven Law Review" doesn't sell anything
as part of the clerkship application; "Yale Law Journal" sells Yale, a company
ofscholars.31 Now that even the elite law reviews accept members from writing
"competitions," the fact that Review membership is a branding factory is all the
more transparent. Like fully-footnoted manuscripts submitted by faculty
authors, hard work by student editors is often in short supply, unless it's
motivated purely by pride, or less often, by fear.
The economy of lawyers, scholars, and students inhabits and reacts to an
institutional environment which is defined, first of all, by the university. The
university, it's reasonable to think, might wonder about the misuse of its name
to support both a quasi-scholarly enterprise with a tenured faculty without
terminal degrees and a segment of its student body that trades on the
university's scholarly reputation to get high paying jobs. The university,
though, is hardly an innocent bystander. Langdell's Harvard embraced a law
review at precisely the time that Charles Eliot was trying to retool Harvard on
the German research university model.32 Legal "science" and faculty
scholarship were both clearly in tune with Eliot's plan. In the process of seizing
the scholarly high ground, the universities and the law schools were also able to
seize control of the terms of legal debate, and to put their people on the cutting
edge of the law in action. 33 In a handful of cases, it's not much of an
exag eration to say that a Harvard Law Review article did, indeed, create the
law. Getting a Harvard Law Review article cited by the Supreme Court of the
United States is the sort of thing that can go to your head. In fact, it may be just
about the only thing that can briefly unsettle the belief that law professors are
the most important members of the legal profession. Scholars don't care so

30 The University of Pennsylvania claims the oldest continuously published legal
periodical in the U.S., since what is now the University of Pennsylvania Law Review started
life in 1852 as the American Law Register. An ALR editor became dean of the law school in
1896 and brought the journal with him, turning it over to students as editors. Outside of
Philadelphia, however, Harvard's is universally recognized as the "oldest" law review. See
Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 755-78 (1985).
31 This phrase comes from GEORGE W. PIERSON, YALE: A SHORT HISTORY (1976).

32 See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 270; Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing
the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 626 (1996); John Henry
Schlegel, Langdell's Auto-da-f&, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 149, 153 (1999).
33 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 58-59 (1977) (describing the

Harvard-model law review as a "massive intellectual achievement" that responded, in part,
to the glut of legal information created by the rise of West's National Reporter System).
34 The canonical example of the influence of a piece of legal scholarship on the law
itself is Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). A better descriptor of this article might be "isolated." Few law review articles have
had such a clear and lasting impact on the law. Even today scholars cite it along with a
handful of other pieces as evidence of the practical significance of legal scholarship. Michael
W. Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 743 n.2
(2006).

2006]

THE IDEA OF THE LAW REVIEW

much about whether their stuff gets read by non-scholars, except when it does,
and when it gets read by the Supreme Court (well, it gets read by the clerks,
and professors are clearly more important than they are), not only do scholars
care, but the rest of the university notices, too.
Not that all of this "legal scholarship" is, or was, such a totally new thing
from the standpoint of the university. In the German model, law had long been
part of the university, because legal scholars were scholars and legal
scholarship was "scholarship" like anything else. 35 It was the English that did
things the other way; the English trained lawyers. But the idea of training
lawyers (what the English did) and the idea of housing scholars in universities
(what the Germans did) didn't come together in a single concept until the
Americans figured it out at the end of the 19th century, at Harvard. The
scholars needed the law reviews to justify staying in the American university;
the lawyers needed the law reviews to justify being treated as scholars. That
system is essentially the same system that we see today. When the university
notices the oddity of the whole thing, it does just that: It notices the oddity,
3 6
basks in the reflected benefits, and then the university largely leaves it alone.
Can I (in a Step Three) tie all of this together? I think so, but whether it
really hangs as an argument is beyond me. But then I'm a law professor, and
it's not clear that this is scholarship. Instead, let me sum up. There are more
actors and interests and institutions to specify, but the point should already be
clear. The theory of the economy of prestige holds that we see a grumpily
mutually-reinforcing symbolic economy of law professors, lawyers, law
students, law schools and their universities processing professional prestige
through the unusual institution known as the law review.
Before I go back to what this has to do with open access and publishing,
however, there is one more bridge to cross.
IV.
The economy of prestige sounds like a house of cards. And it is. We know
this because almost everyone involved regularly complains that law reviews
(and legal scholars) generally produce undisciplined and/or mediocre work and
that such-and-such article either was much better than or worse than its
placement. The most trenchant views come, not surprisingly, from Judge
Posner: "Given the handicaps of ignorance, immaturity, inexperience, and
inadequate incentives, the wonder is not that law reviews leave much to be
37
desired as scholarly journals, but that they aren't much worse than they are."
The Harvard Law Review publishes lousy articles, and so-called fourth-tier law
schools publish good ones. The student editors are uninformed judges of
quality; they select pieces based on the author's reputation, or based on the
35 See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 99-109.
36 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Convergence of the Law School and the University, 44

AM. SCHOLAR 256 (1974).

37 Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1131, 1132 (1995).
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reputation of the author's law school, or based on sexy but fleeting topics.
Student editing typically makes articles worse. Doctrinal scholarship is
uninspired. Interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary labels are convenient cover
for shoddy intellectual arguments that don't meet standards of rigor in "real"
academic departments. Judge Posner is writing about student editors, but there
is much in his commentary that could be-and has been-addressed to faculty
authors.
Judge Posner is hardly alone, though he comes at the problem from an
academic's perspective. From the judicial perspective, his colleagues on the
bench are equally unsparing. 38 Even law professors themselves damn the
system with faint praise; perhaps the best that we say about our own work is
that we're suffering from an identity crisis.3 9 Students are just as cutting in their
criticism of the review system as faculty and judges are. At best, among other
things, top tier students resent being used as unpaid research assistants by
arrogant faculty authors and resent being blamed for their role in the law
review system itself.40 At worst, they're suffering the sins of their ancestors,
that first group of law students who approached Dean Ames for permission to
found the Harvard Law Review.
Importantly, the theory of the economy of prestige has a place for these
critiques. Not only do the criticisms not take hold, but they actually reinforce
the current system. Law reviews need the criticism because it highlights the
sense that the reviews have value in the first place. Menand writes:
In an information, or "symbolic," economy, in other words, the goods
themselves are physically worthless: they are mere print on a page or
code on a disk. What makes them valuable is the recognition that they are
valuable. This recognition is not automatic and intuitive; it has to be
constructed. A work of art has to circulate through a sub-economy of
exchange operated by a large and growing class of middlemen:
publishers, curators, producers, publicists, philanthropists, foundation
officers, critics, professors, and so on. The prize system, with its own
cadre of career administrators and judges, is one of the ways in which
value gets "added on" to a work. Of course, we like to think that the
recognition of artistic excellence is intuitive. We don't like to think of
cultural value as something that requires middlemen-people who are not
artists themselves-in order to emerge. We prefer to believe that truly
good literature or music or film announces itself. Which is another reason
that we need prizes: so that we can insist that we don't really need
them.41

38 See Edwards, supra note 6, at 36-37.
39 See Post, supra note 25, at 615, 624-25 (describing the "demoralization" of legal
scholarship); Todd D. Rakoff, Introduction, Symposium, Law, Knowledge, and the Academy,

115 HARV. L. REv. 1278, 1279 (2002) (noting the multiple dimensions of debates about legal
scholarship).
40 See J.C. Oleson, You Make Me [Sic]: Confessions of a Sadistic Law Review Editor,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1135 (2004).
41 Menand, supra note 13, at 137. See ENGLISH, supra note 11, at 197-216.
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If you believe this, then what matters about the law review system is that
the law schools sponsor the journals, and that the journals (or at least the article
titles and attribution) get effectively communicated to other scholars. Nothing
else matters much (not article quality, not selection mechanisms, not the way
the articles are edited or how clearly they are written). So long as we freely
criticize what the journals produce and how they produce it, almost everyone in
legal academia will still want to get published in the Harvard Law Review.42
Law professors have been pressing at the edges of this system by doing a
variety of things that make it appear that they really do want an audience. Some
law reviews have moved toward publishing more "commentaries" alongside
full-blown articles, 43 and toward doing at least some of this on the Internet.
Law professors are blogging. They are posting manuscripts on online open
access archives like the Legal Scholarship Network at the Social Science
Research Network (SSRN), and via bepress. Some of the "elite" law reviews
have formed a cartel to police the length of law review articles. 4 There have
been calls for faculty to reject the system of student-edited reviews and to
publish with peer-reviewed journals, 45 and through university presses. 46 Not all
of these things represent "scholarship" or moves toward improved
"scholarship," but there seem to be cracks in the law review foundation. What
these really represent, I think, is not much more than ratification of the
constructed-ness of the whole thing. Law reviews are the centers of the prestige
economy precisely because of law professors' anxiety over whether anything
that we write actually matters. The more we chip away at the core of the
system, the more we manifest that anxiety. The urgency of our implicit claim
("it's shorter and easier to read, so please listen!") only heightens the contrast
between the new forms and traditional scholarship. It makes the latter that
much more central to our scholarly standing.

42 Virtually all of this extends to criticism of legal scholarship by scholars in other
disciplines, who are appalled that the university grants tenure to people who don't publish in
peer-reviewed journals. Withdrawal of university sponsorship and/or a collapse of the
implicit hierarchy of law review "quality" undoubtedly would lead over time to substantial
withdrawal of the generalized acceptance of law schools in universities. Without universitysponsorship for faculty scholarship, law schools would look uncomfortably like trade
schools.
43 Law reviews at Harvard, Yale, and Hofstra, among other law schools, have each
recently begun to publish shorter and more timely commentaries and/or responses to
"regular" scholarship. Harvard now publishes an online "Forum" (see Harvard Law Review
Forum, About the Forum, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/aboutforum.shtml). Yale
publishes The Pocket Part online (see Yale Law Journal, The Pocket Part,
http://www.thepocketpart.org/). Hofstra includes an "Ideas" section in its printed law review
(see Hofstra Law Review, Ideas, http://www.hofstra.edu/Academics/Law/LawRev/
indexLawRev.cfrn).
4Z For a cheerful view of this development, see Robert C. Berring, Less is More. Really,
8 GREEN BAG 2d 231 (2005).
45 See Posner, supra note 6, at 58.
46 See Rosa Brooks, LawCulture, Goodbye to Law Reviews? (Jan. 17, 2006),
http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/2006/01/goodbye-to-law .html.
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V.

In an important sense, debating why open access hasn't made it to the law
reviews is simply piling more criticism on an institution that's been taking a
beating for a good long while. And without doubt, some law review articles are
"better" than others, often much better, and the better stuff generates prestige
for the publishing review and its law school and even its university. The
economy of prestige not only goes round and round, but it also goes back and
forth. Here, though, I should turn my attention to what the economy of prestige
has to do with open access, or more precisely, how the publication model
matters.
In the economy of prestige, something else has to happen between making
something available to read and actually having it read. Professors, like most
people, care about those two things in different degrees. I assume that most
professors really, really like having scholarship (especially their own
scholarship) available to read. I also assume that far fewer professors actually
care about whether their scholarly work gets widely read. Read by colleagues,
certainly, and when I say "colleagues," I mean both current and aspirational
colleagues (people we would like to know and/or work with) but not
necessarily by anyone beyond that. The gap between distribution and
consumption, so to speak, is filled by authority. Among those who read the
work, it's important that the work be authoritative, or at least credible. As Rob
Kling observed, any scholarly publishing model has to account both for
publicizing the work, and for declaring that the work is trustworthy. Merely
making it accessible isn't enough.
In the old days of law reviews, before LexisNexis and Westlaw came
along in the early 1980s, print publication and the imprint of the universitybased law school often served as both publicity and validation enough. 47 In a
related vein, Bob Berring has described the "cognitive authority" of the
inherently limited circulation of other print-based legal literature: the National
Reporter System, the West Digest System, and Shepard's. 48 Scholars of print
have noted the inherently authoritative nature of "the book." Traditional law
reviews, like all scholarly publications, benefited accordingly. Once
LexisNexis and Westlaw started putting full texts of law reviews on their
databases, the authority of print started to recede, leaving the authority of the
publisher and, to a lesser extent, the authority of limited access. A lot of law
professors these days never actually handle original physical copies of law
review articles, unless they're stuffing envelopes with reprints to send out to
colleagues. The patois of the professoriate long ago started to refer to
47 See Hibbitts, supra note 32, at 616.
48

See Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Searchfor Cognitive Authority, 88

CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1692, 1695 (2000). Frederick Schauer describes the ambiguities inherent

in the authority that we assign to legal scholarship and concludes that "legal scholarship may
at times be treated as more authoritative than a perfectly rational decisionmaking
environment would allow." Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1003, 1017 (1991).
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placement of an article simply by the school name, that is, by the authority of
the brand. "I'm publishing in NYU," or "I'm publishing in Florida State," is a
perfectly comprehensible statement among legal scholars.
The inherent limitations of print distribution meant that law review
circulation built its own economy of prestige. Even for the Harvard Law
Review, whose subscriber base far exceeds that of any of its scholarly peers,
subscription created an aura of scholarly exclusivity. As a law student, I was a
member of the law review at Stanford, and I remember more or less what I
thought when I learned that a recent graduate of the law school had purchased
an individual subscription to the Review: Man, that guy must be a serious
intellectual!
The commercial database model obviously can't match that aura step-forstep, since the databases include so much non-scholarly legal literature.
Westlaw's JLR database includes PLI and ALI-ABA course materials as well
as the Yale Law Journal. But the relative exclusivity of the databases does have
that effect. Pricing models differentiate between practitioners, on the one hand,
and law schools and judges' chambers, on the other. Practitioners often pay
metered rates for access to the database; law schools pay a flat rate. Unlike
practicing lawyers, law professors can search and use the databases at no
marginal cost. It feels free.49 We're inside the scholarly system again, and the
rest of the world is outside.
What I described in the last Part as "cracks in the law review foundation"
are tangible echoes of critiques of commercial publishing for scholarship. In the
economy of prestige, and in terms of the publishing component of that
economy, those cracks don't reflect a breakdown of the economy so much as
they reflect anxiety over its integrity. Law professor blogging is an effort to
shore up the law review publishing model rather than an effort to undermine it,
just as law faculty who post pre-prints (and post-prints) on SSRN and bepress
are quick to defend the practice on the ground that it complements law review
publication. 50 Right now, open access for law review publishing is treated like
bashing law reviews for publishing sloppily-edited, undisciplined work-as a
justification for the status quo.
What would happen to this economy of prestige if law reviews not only
adopted open access publication policies but also pushed authors to publish
their work in open access archives? Faculty would still submit their pieces to
law reviews, have them selected, edited and formally published by law reviews,
and then distribute their fully-edited articles on their own, for free, via their
own websites or archives run by other people. What then?
One possibility, and this is the possibility that I think worries most faculty
who actually bother to think about it, is that this would end up cutting the law
schools out of the publishing business entirely. Some people see this as a good
49 Some law reviews post open access versions of their content on their websites, but
until search mechanisms for scholarship on the Web become as easy to use as Lexis and
Westlaw search engines, lack of publicity for open access versions means that they remain
poor substitutes for commercialized versions.
50 See Hunter, supra note 4, at 633.
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thing. In 1996, as the Internet was first being recognized for its broad popular
(and popularizing, disintermediating) potential, Bernard Hibbitts foretold legal
51
scholars' bypassing the law reviews and publishing their work directly online.
Ten years on, this hasn't happened, which tells me that the economy of prestige
is, in fact, an important part of the system. If open access is a stalking horse for
this sort of thing, and if law reviews and law professors right now are making
that kind of connection (that is, if.we do this open access thing, why have a law
review at all?), then it's no surprise to find that law reviews and law professors
haven't jumped on board. They've got a good thing going, and they don't see
why they should put that at risk. It's more than a massive collective action
problem. Lots of faculty literally can't see that open access will do them any
good. Why undermine the institution that makes the economy of prestige hum?
On the other hand, if open access leaves the law review system more or
less as is, with everyone still sucking prestige out of the system as fast as new
articles can be pushed in, then there's no reason not to welcome it. The worst
case scenario is that we end up with a lot of digital copies of things that no one
reads. The best case is that someone figures out a way actually to get the useful
material into the hands of the people who need it. Open access gets hitched to
publicity and quality-validation mechanisms that, in tandem, re-create the
economy of prestige.
VI.
Those two possibilities sketch a kind of open access "innovator's
dilemma." That phrase belongs to Clayton Christensen, at the Harvard Business
School. 52 The innovator's dilemma is a management problem. Classic "good"
management, over time, tends to focus on products and services that enhance
the firm's classic mission, or what Christensen calls "sustaining" technologies.
Over time, firms that focus on sustaining technologies do so rationally, and
they ultimately get knocked aside by firms that invest in "disruptive"
technologies, that is, in paradigm shifting products and services that start out in
niche markets but end up as category killers. The innovator's dilemma is that
good managers have no incentive to invest in disruption, so they don't. Good
companies die as a result.
Since the economy of prestige borrows the vocabulary of markets, it seems
altogether appropriate to borrow another tool from the business toolbox. Open
access, with its threat to scholars' economy of prestige, is perceived as a
potentially disruptive technology. (Perceived by whom? It's fair to ask. The
answer, of course, is "everyone.") No one can know whether marginalizing
open access will lead to the catastrophic failure of the current, dominant
publishing and prestige model. But Christensen's work does offer a way to
limit the downside risk. Christensen has a series of prescriptions for managers
who want to capture disruptive technologies. The one that seems to have the
51 See Hibbitts, supra note 32, at 668.
52 See
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most traction, both in his work and beyond, is locating development of
disruptive technologies in organizations and places that are distinct from the
basic firm framework. New city, new building, no organizational ties; don't
make it a profit center; let new ideas fail and grow on small scales and build
customer demand from the outside.
How might law reviews (and legal scholars, and law schools, and
universities) do that? How can the legal scholars' economy of prestige capture
the potential value of a disruptive open access model? Here's a sketch of a
proposal for how to make that work by building a structure that allows the
disruptive model to get a foothold and grow.
Open access publishing can be part of a working prestige economy if
scholarly publication is standardized to a format that permits scholars in
relevant disciplines to develop a digital "tagging" specification that can be read
by Internet search engines and other online communications tools. Works in
open access archives could be labeled electronically, that is, tagged, classified,
and rated along various dimensions, by scholars and, potentially, by others.
Those tags would consist of digital markers that are electronically associated
with individual manuscripts. 53 The Right to Privacy by Warren and Brandeis,
for example, could be associated with tags labeled "privacy" and "very high
quality," for example (in addition to many others). Online search software
programmed to search specifically for scholarly publications (such as Google
Scholar) could include options that permit searching for and sorting results
according to one or more tags. The result would be a kind of dynamic,
searchable, shareable, bottom-up post-publication form of peer review. Tags
could specify subjective characteristics that relate to authority, trustworthiness,
and quality ("comprehensive," "advanced," "introductory"), as well as field,
subject matter, theoretical orientation, and even more objective criteria, such as
length, author, publisher, and so on.
How this gets off the ground is beyond my expertise (in fact, since I'm a
law professor, most everything is beyond my expertise), but clearly it's easier
for a handful of open access archives or even a handful of faculty members to
get together on this sort of thing than it is for 6,000 law professors to commit to
revamping the prestige model as a group. Importantly, none of this requires
cooperation by the law reviews themselves or even substantial initial
54
participation by a critical number of faculty, law schools, or universities.
SSRN, meet bepress and Paul Caron's Law Professor Blogs network. Bepress,
meet SSRN and Law Professor Blogs. This is even the sort of thing that the
blogosphere may be good at, that is, not in generating scholarship itself, but in
solving a coordination problem at a very low level. A single faculty blogger
with the technical skill (or support) to begin to implement the scheme that I'm
describing could attract enough traffic to get the enterprise off the ground. The
53 For the digerati among you, the proposal is obviously based on social tagging

systems such as Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
54 Cf Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 153 (describing the virtues of social software in facilitating the emergence of
informal groups).
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blogging and short-form "scholarship" that I characterized as cracks in the law
review foundation may turn out to be precursors of something like this, that is,
something that clearly feeds the existing economy of prestige, but from outside
the traditional law review system. If successful, tags for open access
scholarship (perhaps extending to tags for non-traditional short-form
scholarship, too) may displace the current economy's center of gravity, so that
prestige hums around the distributed tags as much as or even to an extent
greater than it hums around the journals' institutional prestige. This summary
focuses mostly on the law professors' perspective. It is possible that the same
thing could work from the reviews' perspective. Some "tags" could be purely
descriptive, so that the work is "tagged" with the journal name. Via extension
of their brands, law reviews themselves would capture the prestige benefits
they seek. 55 By offering scholars a means of re-creating the economy of
prestige, a disruptive open access model, in other words, has the potential to
morph into something altogether new, rather than implicit validation of the
status quo.56 The fact that knowledge may be more widely distributed is a
happy byproduct of the process.
VII.
Can this be right? As I said above, I'm not the first person to frame journal
publishing or law review publishing in terms of prestige. In his article
forecasting the demise of law reviews in the face of online self-publishing by
scholars, Bernard Hibbitts called the prestige argument "specious":
"Halo effects" are intellectually suspect-surely serious scholars would
agree that scholarly articles should ultimately be evaluated on their own
merits, rather than according to the prestige of the law review in which
they appear, especially when the law reviews exercise little if any true
quality control. In this context, eliminating the "halo effect" of placement
would remove a significant temptation in the way of free and fair
evaluation of scholarship, while at the same time (re)focusing the
attention of law professors on doing their57 scholarly work for its own sake,
rather than playing the placement game.
The idealism is breathtaking.
If only this were true. In the decade since Hibbitts made this argument, and
despite the presence of easy-to-use online publishing tools, law professors
haven't exactly embraced the idea that what they really want is honest,
55 Some law review editors have told me recently that they are beginning to look at open
access publication in precisely this light, so long as authors label their articles with journal
names. Digital tagging reifies and potentially extends the effect.
56 A somewhat related model of authoritative electronic publishing defined
dynamically by the members of a discipline is described in Rob Kling, Lisa Spector & Geoff
McKim, Locally Controlled Scholarly Publishing Via the Internet: The Guild Model, J.
ELECTRONIC PUB., Aug. 2002, http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/08-01/kling.html (originally
published in the Proceedings of the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Society for
Information Science and Technology).
57 Hibbitts, supra note 32, at 679.
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reasoned feedback directly from colleagues. In fact, I suspect that few
academics really want that sort of thing. The only medium where this sort of
exchange is occurring today is the expanding blogosphere, which is more and
more full of law professors engaging in frank, direct dialogues.5 8 But in the vast
majority of cases, blogs are not "scholarship," and some of the most widelyread law professor bloggers expressly disclaim the idea that what they are
doing is scholarship.5 9 (Related to scholarship, yes; actual scholarship, no.)
Rather, those frank discussions tend to confirm the importance of their target.
The very openness of blogs confirms both the speciousness and the specialness
of law review publishing.
In fact, not only does the economy of prestige model predict that law
reviews in their present form could not simply be abolished, but it also predicts
that law reviews (and law schools, and law professors) have little incentive to
improve the quality of legal scholarship. I've said nothing, for example, about
exchanging publication in student-edited journals for publication in
(supposedly higher quality) peer-reviewed journals. It's implicit in what I've
argued that as parts of the economy of prestige, these two selection and
editorial systems are roughly interchangeable. The law schools finance the law
reviews with cash, academic credit for students, promotion and tenure
recognition for faculty, and salaries that support faculty research. Because they
are underwritten so heavily by the university, law reviews are equipped to
deliver all the prestige that anyone-at least anyone on a law faculty-needs.
Most peer-reviewed scholarly journals come from commercial publishers,
where underwriting comes through the marketplace. Authors and subscribers of
these journals want prestige, too, but the universities aren't in a position to
supply it. Faculty depend on grants for research support; peer reviews of
proposals and of the resulting literature jointly supply the prestige that justifies
.61
the sbscr*
price. In a way, obviously, the two systems resemble each
the subscription
other. In each case the economy of prestige ultimately runs through faculty
offices. That's not to say that the two systems have the same strengths and
weaknesses, since they don't. Law professors have widely varying opinions on
the merits of law reviews, and some express pretty strong views regarding the
merits of peer review. But each model, in different ways, is designed to

58 Note that my "tagging" suggestion doesn't require disclosure of individual reader or
rater identities; in fact, it might be most effective if participation were limited to law faculty
but individual identities were omitted by default.
59 See Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Bloggership: How Blogs are
Transforming Legal Scholarship, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOURResults.cfm?
form-name=joumalbrowse&journalid=890371 (last visited Oct. 16, 2006) (archiving
papers from the April 28, 2006 Bloggership Symposium at Harvard Law School's Berkman
Center for Internet & Society).
60 See Harriet Zuckerman & Robert K. Merton, Patterns of Evaluation in Science:
Institutionalisation,Structure and Functionsof the Referee System, 9 MINERVA 66 (1971).
61 See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Yesterday Once More: Skeptics, Scribes and the Demise of

Law Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV. 267, 294-95 (1996); Bernard Wysocki Jr., Scholarly
Journals'PremierStatus Is Dilutedby Web, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2005, at Al.
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generate and maintain the kind of prestige that scholars crave. 62 Open access is
consistent or inconsistent with either one in equal measure, or least on the same
terms that I've argued apply to journals generally. I don't need to take a
position on the merits of peer review, but it strikes me as unlikely that the law
schools will get out of the journal business any time soon. Inertia is a powerful
thing. Law professors are unlikely to be willing to shoulder the real burdens of
peer review, especially if a new version of the prestige economy can emerge at
lower cost.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I suggested at the outset that this piece was really about open access in
general, and only about law reviews in particular, rather than vice versa. I want
to deliver on that suggestion. Does the economy of prestige theory have
anything to say about the one scholarly community that seems to have wholeheartedly embraced open access principles for its scholarship, which is
physics? The physicists' arcXiv.org open access e-print archive has co-existed
peacefully with proprietary physics journals for 15 years. 63 The community of
physics scholars and commercial physics journals hasn't collapsed. Why not? If
the economy of prestige theory is right, and if I've applied it correctly to law
professors and law reviews, then there must be some relevant differences
between physicists and lawyers, and maybe we can use those differences to
sketch some predictions regarding the likely success of open access efforts in
other fields. It's possible, for example, that physicists don't care much about
prestige. That seems doubtful. Or, open access publishing has supplemented the
existing physicists' economy of prestige with a prestige dimension of its own.
(In other words, for example, open access may be so cool in the physics
departments that everyone has to get with the program.) I doubt that, too. Or,
still, physicists may get their prestige (and their funding) in some way other
than the disciplinary validation and self-congratulation that follows scholarly
publication, as in law.
My intuition is that this third hypothesis is the strongest one,64 and here's
why. If you're really unlocking the secrets of the universe, then you sleep
62 Zuckerman and Merton characterize the issue slightly differently; they describe it as
"authority." See Zuckerman & Merton, supra note 60, at 95-96. That's not quite the same
thing as prestige, but it's pretty close, and the constructedness of both shows that peerreview and student-edited law school publishing are designed basically to accomplish the
same thing, in very different ways. Berring, supra note 48, and Schauer, supra note 48,
complete the circle by talking about mechanisms of authority for legal literature.
Descriptions of the declining role of traditional legal authority in judicial decision-making
reflect anxiety over the singular position of legal scholarship. See Frederick Schauer &
Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1080 (1997);
Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts:An Empirical
Study, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 659 (1998).
63 See Kling et al., supra note 3.
64 Rob Kling and his colleagues suggest something similar in their comparison of the
social locations of physicists and physicians, and the development of PubMed Central. See
id. Their focus, however, is on institutional structure, not symbolic or cognitive structures.
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pretty soundly at night. The exception, in other words, proves the rule. The
economy of prestige assumes a constructed universe, a universe of cultural
goods. Physics research isn't just a cultural good. Physics knowledge is
constructed along with everything else, but it's constructed at such a deep level
that our ordinary selves, and physicists most of all, don't see it that way. So it's
good in itself in a way that "legal scholarship" really isn't. Physicists-who
are, after all, smarter than lawyers-get this. Open access flourishes for them
because they know that their brass ring isn't tenure and a spot at the university
that exempts them from representing real clients with real problems and
delivering real results. Their brass ring is the Grand Unified Theory of
Everything.
This distinction is obviously more spectrum than either/or. Modeling legal
scholarship as an economy of prestige implies that the made dominates the true,
but scholars of all kinds want to be right as well as respected. 65 Does this
slightly more refined idea of the law review, sharpened by contrast with
scholarship in at least one salient discipline, tell us something that we can use
to understand where and how to best operationalize open access? Legal
scholarship isn't quite so important in the scheme of things, but scholars do
care about the distribution of legal knowledge, even if it's often made up.
If I truly knew the answer to that question, then maybe I really could get
published in the Harvard Law Review (which would be great!), so all I can do
here is speculate a little bit. I think that the answer is yes. Maybe open access
works for knowledge goods that have intrinsic value and not for knowledge
goods that don't. Maybe the law reviews' reluctance to adopt open access
policies and law professors' reluctance to seek out open access publication is a
kind of jurisprudential clue. If law professors really want open access to take
hold in legal scholarship, then they-that is, we-should take empiricism more
seriously than we often do. Or, if we want to keep up our (and my) pose of
reflective self-absorption, we need the justification and prestige that the current
publishing system supplies. I'm not confident that we can have it both ways.
Making open access work in any context requires understanding a cultural
economy. If open access doesn't challenge that economy, the two can co-exist,
side-by-side. That's the model that I see in physics. Maybe open access
undermines that economy. That's the threat that legal scholars and law reviews
(and, I suspect, scholars and journals in a lot of fields) currently perceive. For
cultural goods, the best hope for open access advocates may be to promote and
build out a system in which the cultural economy incorporates and capitalizes
on open access, giving the publishing platform a viable justification in
recognizable cultural terms. This isn't a Field of Dreams; if you build it, they
won't come. Open access tools and other resources must be designed so that
they get taken up in the existing economic framework. If that new system
operates from the outside in, becoming embedded in the economy, then it has
the potential to subvert that economy from the inside out, starting from its

65 See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theoryfor EvaluatingLegal Scholarship,
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embedded position. Who knows if that will ever happen? But if it does, the
distribution of knowledge that is the real idea of open access might be realized.

